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SENTENCING AFTER STASH HOUSES:
ADDRESSING MANIPULATION OF THE FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
Elizabeth Foy Gudgel*
In the realm of undercover work, law enforcement has broad discretion to
define the contours of a criminal offense. Due to quantity-based provisions
in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, federal agents or their informants may
coerce an individual into a higher sentencing range by escalating their
behavior to align with mandatory minimums or quantifiable offense levels.
Because this type of offense is police-initiated, law enforcement has
discretion to select the individuals subject to these tactics and influence their
eventual sentences. The defenses of sentencing entrapment and sentencing
manipulation are meant to combat this discretion. However, these defenses
are rarely invoked successfully and often fail to provide defendants with
relief at the sentencing phase.
These defenses received new attention after the proliferation of “fake stash
house” cases that displayed a pattern of selective enforcement in federal
sting operations. Subsequent litigation showed that federal agents almost
exclusively targeted people of color for these stings and incarcerated
hundreds of these individuals with inflated sentences. This Note proposes
that the findings of that litigation can be used to argue for reduced sentences
under a judge’s consideration of the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) to provide relief for defendants caught in similar schemes. This
Note draws on data obtained in the stash house litigation and on documented
instances of similar selective enforcement cases to illustrate the necessity of
sentencing relief in cases where law enforcement weaponizes the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Accordingly, this Notes argues that bolstering
defensive arguments at sentencing could provide warranted relief for
individuals sentenced as a result of coercive, discriminatory tactics.

* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Johns Hopkins
University. A sincere thank you to Professor John Pfaff, Melissa Romanovich, and the staff
of the Fordham Law Review for their invaluable guidance and edits. I am most grateful for
the humor and support of my extraordinary friends at this law school, without whom this
would still be a draft.
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INTRODUCTION
Undercover policing, confidential informants, and “sting” operations are
familiar law enforcement tactics.1 In this realm of undercover work, police
officers and federal agents have broad discretion to define the contours of a
criminal offense.2 They may initiate contact with a suspected narcotics
dealer and stretch out purchases over time to obtain a higher quantity of

1. See Eda Katharine Tinto, Undercover Policing, Overstated Culpability, 34 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1401, 1402 (2013).
2. See id.
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drugs.3 They can offer to obtain a weapon for a suspect, encouraging him4
to select an automatic weapon over a handgun.5 They may guide the
transaction toward a school zone, request for a suspect to bring associates to
a meeting, or provide money for a suspect to front a laundering scheme.6
Critically, law enforcement also selects whom to ensnare in these
operations.7
Within the current federal sentencing regime of guidelines and mandatory
minimums, these enforcement decisions can functionally determine a
defendant’s sentence.8 By relying on knowledge of sentencing provisions,
law enforcement can manipulate an individual’s behavior to align with
mandatory minimums, guideline provisions, or sentencing enhancements.9
These discretionary choices result in higher sentences because of factors in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”) that tie larger volumes
of narcotics, money, or weapons to greater offense levels.10 The Guidelines
are full of similar quantity-based provisions or enhancements for theft
offenses, money laundering, or tax evasion.11
The defenses of sentencing entrapment and sentencing manipulation are
intended to combat this discretion to ratchet up a criminal offense.12 A
sentencing entrapment claim alleges that the defendant was deliberately
induced into more severe criminal activity than he otherwise was predisposed
to.13 A sentencing manipulation claim alleges that the arresting officer
intentionally manipulated the scenario to align with guideline provisions that
secure a higher sentence.14 These sentencing defenses focus on severity.
They do not argue that the defendant was wholly forced into offending, but
rather that the severity of the offense was much greater because of law
3. See, e.g., United States v. Boykin, 785 F.3d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 423 (8th Cir. 1993).
4. When referring to “defendants,” this Note uses he/him/his pronouns to reflect the
criminal legal system’s predominant focus on male-identifying individuals. See Sonja Starr,
Estimating Gender Disparities in Federal Criminal Cases 14–17 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch. Law
& Econ. Working Papers, Paper No. 57, 2012).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1506 (8th Cir. 1996).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Bala, 236 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (sentencing defendant—
who had no record of involvement in money laundering—to fifty-one months after federal
agents requested he assist them in laundering hundreds of thousands of dollars over four
separate transactions); United States v. Atwater, 336 F. Supp. 2d 626, 627 (E.D. Va. 2004)
(involving police conduct that induced the defendant to conduct a drug transaction within
1,000 feet of a school); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover
Police Participation in Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 156 (2009).
7. See Joh, supra note 6, at 157.
8. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1403.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See Todd E. Witten, Comment, Sentence Entrapment and Manipulation: Government
Manipulation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AKRON L. REV. 697, 705 (1996).
12. Several circuit courts distinguish between “sentencing entrapment” and “sentencing
manipulation,” although both defenses are typically a response to the same set of facts. For
clarity, this Note refers to these defenses separately. For a more thorough explanation of the
differences between the defenses, see infra Part II.B.
13. Tinto, supra note 1, at 1403.
14. See id.
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enforcement encouragement, delay in arrest, or manipulation of factors
outside the defendant’s control.15
In theory, a successful sentencing entrapment or manipulation defense
would warrant a downward departure from the Guidelines or a lower
sentence in recognition of the officer’s role in pushing the defendant’s
behavior toward a higher offense level.16 In reality, sentencing entrapment
and manipulation defenses are widely unsuccessful.17 This is due, in part, to
federal courts’ erratic treatment of these defenses.18 There is no uniform
name for these defenses, no standard approach to evaluating them, and no
agreement that manipulation warrants leniency in sentencing.19 In federal
district courts, defendants are regularly sentenced for volumes of narcotics,
weapons, or money that were the result of coercion.20
Recent litigation of “fake stash house” stings—a federal law enforcement
tactic designed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) or the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to ensnare targets in
fictional robberies21—also questions the role that a defendant’s race plays in
manipulated sentencing.22 In these schemes, an undercover agent or
confidential informant recruits individuals to assist them in robbing a
fictitious stash house containing a specific amount of drugs, weapons, or
cash.23 The volumes of substances in the house are selected to correspond to
mandatory minimums or quantity-based sentences in the Guidelines.24 When
the targets arrive to the predetermined location to execute the ploy, they are
immediately arrested by federal agents.25 The house and the drugs—the
entirety of the setup—are a fiction of the government’s design, but the
individuals involved are charged under guideline recommendations or
mandatory minimums that the scheme triggered.26 Defendants caught in
these schemes received decades-long sentences because of the high volumes

15. These defenses are distinct from the defense of “entrapment,” a trial defense that
wholly immunizes a defendant from prosecution. See Joh, supra note 6, at 172.
16. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1404. For an explanation of sentencing enhancements and
downward departures, see infra Part I.A.
17. See Witten, supra note 11, at 726 (“Although popular with defendants, the sentence
entrapment defense has not been warmly received by courts.”).
18. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1404.
19. See id. (“State and federal courts are widely divergent in both their definitions of the
claim and their application of [sentencing manipulation] in practice.”).
20. See id. at 1403.
21. See Benjamin Weiser, In D.E.A. Sting Operations, Robberies Aren’t Real, but
Charges Are, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/nyregion/
in-dea-sting-operations-robberies-arent-real-but-charges-are.html [https://perma.cc/5QD9KDN3].
22. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 298–300 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing a
common stash house setup involving a confidential informant).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 311 n.14. (upholding a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b), which applied because the fictitious robbery involved five kilograms of
cocaine).
25. See id.
26. See id.
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of narcotics the government chose to lure the targets with—the fact that those
drugs never existed was irrelevant to their sentence.27
In the past five years, fake stash house tactics received significant
condemnation when investigations revealed that the government sought out
young, financially insecure people of color for these schemes.28 In the cities
where the DEA or ATF conducted these stings, nearly every defendant
targeted was Black or Latine.29 A series of lawsuits highlighting these
disparities resulted in widespread case dismissals, sentencing reductions, and
the release of individuals incarcerated by these tactics.30 Significant court
denunciation indicates that fake stash houses are slowly being “relegated to
the dark corridors of our past.”31
The legal challenges resulting in exoneration or early release were
undoubted successes for individuals caught in these schemes, sentenced to
spend decades in prison for a crime impossible to commit.32 But, they are
extreme examples of a phenomenon that is likely much more common in law
enforcement and is not always met with the same reproach.33 Whether
posing as street-level dealers, buyers, or traffickers, or encouraging
coconspirators, the police, DEA, and ATF have significant opportunities to
choose their targets selectively and escalate their behavior to trigger longer
periods of incarceration.34 These lower-level manipulated offenses rarely
receive the same attention as fake stash house stings because they do not
result in the same extreme sentences, often do not prompt media outcry, and
do not have a team of highly resourced attorneys working to combat them.35
And, while there is now a body of data on the racial disparities in stash house
27. See Annie Sweeney & Jason Meisner, “Stash House” Stings Have Been Discredited.
Now, the Convicted See a Chance for Redemption, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 5, 2021, 1:51 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/criminal-justice/ct-stash-house-defendantscompassionate-release-20210305-qiwa4codkzabhpsalorsns35ae-story.html
[https://perma.cc/QJ3B-5DUJ].
28. See, e.g., Brad Heath, Investigation: ATF Drug Stings Targeted Minorities, USA
TODAY (July 20, 2014, 3:40 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/
20/atf-stash-house-stings-racial-profiling/12800195/ [https://perma.cc/7VV5-LNLT] (finding
that 91 percent of people incarcerated for ATF stash house stings were racial or ethnic
minorities).
29. See id.
30. See Jason Meisner, Under Pressure by Judges, Prosecutors to Offer Plea Deals in
Controversial Drug Stash House Cases, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 21, 2018, 4:55 PM),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-atf-stash-house-prosecutions20180221-story.html [https://perma.cc/TT8Z-KHAX].
31. United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
32. See, e.g., Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 27.
33. See Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United States: Towards
a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1057–60 (1993)
(describing escalating use of reverse sting operations by the government, initially in the
narcotics context).
34. See id.
35. The exact statistics on the number of defendants reliant on public defenders are
outdated, but generally, approximately 70 percent of defendants in federal courts rely on
publicly financed counsel. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3CF-CPVY].
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cases, there is little comparable transparency into how law enforcement
escalates sentences for defendants in lower-level undercover arrests, and
whether these arrests mirror stash house cases in their racially
disproportionate enforcement.36
This Note examines the defenses of sentencing entrapment and sentencing
manipulation for these lower-level manipulated offenses in light of the recent
stash house litigation that reveals clear racial discrimination in DEA and ATF
tactics. Significant academic analyses have examined the ethical quandaries
of police inducement and have proposed judicial reforms to strengthen
sentencing entrapment and manipulation claims.37 But very few examine
whether sentencing manipulation may disproportionately ensnare Black and
Brown defendants and whether this phenomenon may be addressed at the
sentencing level.
This Note neither attempts to reform the disorderly doctrines of sentencing
entrapment and manipulation, nor does it present conclusive data on selective
enforcement. Rather, this Note proposes new arguments to use at sentencing
to combat this phenomenon of racist enhancement and manipulation on
behalf of individuals subjected to law enforcement conduct that weaponizes
the Guidelines’ quantity-based approach.38 In doing so, this Note draws from
data obtained in stash house cases and similar selective enforcement suits to
argue that the manipulation of sentences warrants a downward variance
under a sentencing court’s consideration of sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).
Part I of this Note provides the relevant background in federal sentencing
practices and explains the opportunities for manipulation in the Guidelines’
quantity-based approach. Part I also introduces stash house stings, similar
lower-level manipulated offenses, and subsequent litigation that scrutinized
these schemes’ racialized tactics. Part II discusses the various circuit court
approaches to sentencing entrapment and manipulation defenses, as well as
the debated rationales behind such claims. Part III argues that these defenses,
in their current form, offer inadequate protection for defendants subjected to
manipulated sentences. Part III then proposes using the tactics and findings
of stash house cases to improve arguments at the sentencing stage in cases
involving lower-level manipulated offenses, framed as a request for a
downward variance within a sentencing judge’s existing § 3553(a)
discretion.

36. See, e.g., Samuel R. Wiseman, The Criminal Justice Black Box, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 349,
350–57 (2017) (describing the challenges of obtaining accurate arrest, sentencing, and
incarceration data).
37. See, e.g., Molly F. Spakowski, Comment, Crafted from Whole Cloth: Reverse
Stash-House Stings and the Sentencing Factor Manipulation Claim, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 451,
455 (2019); Jess D. Mekeel, Note, Misnamed, Misapplied, Misguided: Clarifying the State of
Sentencing Entrapment and Proposing a New Conception of the Doctrine, 14 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 1583, 1585–86 (2006).
38. See infra Part III.
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I. SENTENCING AND THE STASH HOUSE STING: MANIPULATION OF THE
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
This part discusses the historical sentencing developments that created the
opportunity for manipulated sentences. Part I.A briefly describes the history
of federal sentencing and the implementation of the Guidelines. Part I.B
describes the manipulable qualities of the Guidelines and how these qualities
were used in a racially selective manner to secure higher sentences in fake
stash house operations. Part I.C discusses how these tactics are applied to
lower-level offenses. Part I.D describes how courts typically address these
cases and the potential to improve these arguments at sentencing hearings.
A. A Brief History of Federal Sentencing
Prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, federal courts subscribed to an
indeterminate sentencing regime.39 Under this model, judges provided
sentences within a range (such as “five to ten years”). Local parole boards
then determined the exact release date for an incarcerated individual.40
Indeterminate sentencing, in theory, stemmed from a rehabilitative approach
to punishment: judges sentenced a range of years based on an individual
assessment of the defendant, and parole boards were trusted with measuring
an incarcerated individual’s “progress” or “rehabilitation” within that
prescribed sentence.41 This discretionary model led to wide sentencing
disparities in similarly situated defendants, consistently to the detriment of
racial minorities.42
This unstandardized approach invited criticism from reformists, which
gained traction in the 1970s.43 Liberal critiques focused on the inconsistent
discretionary power of judges and parole boards.44 A widely circulated
report published at the time deemed the emotional impact of an indeterminate
sentence—in which incarcerated individuals have no clear notion of their
release date—an “exquisite form of torture.”45 A similar critique by Judge
Marvin E. Frankel of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York condemned the sentencing system that afforded individual judges such
broad discretion in a legal system that otherwise prioritized certainty and

39. See Nancy Gertner, A Short History of American Sentencing: Too Little Law, Too
Much Law, or Just Right, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 691, 695–96 (2010).
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Griffin Edwards, Stephen Rushin & Joseph Colquitt, The Effects of Voluntary and
Presumptive Sentencing Guidelines, 98 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8 (2019); Lawrence P. Tiffany, Yakov
Avichai & Geoffrey W. Peters, A Statistical Analysis of Sentencing in Federal Courts:
Defendants Convicted After Trial, 1967–1968, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 369, 387–88 (1975) (noting
that Black defendants in federal court received significantly longer sentences than similarly
situated white defendants).
43. See Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised
Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 992 (2013).
44. See id.
45. Id. (quoting AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 29 (1971)).

214

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

finality.46 Conservative reformists took issue with indeterminate sentencing
as well.47 A burgeoning right-wing opposition to penal rehabilitation
emerged, arguing for a focus on punishing the severity of the act rather than
on encouraging rehabilitation of the “offender.”48
The long-term effects of criminal policy shifts in the late twentieth century
are borne out today in the country’s legacy as the largest carceral state on
earth.49 These policies led to the founding of the U.S. Sentencing
Commission in 1984, the congressional group responsible for promulgating
and updating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.50 The Guidelines
minimized an individual judge’s discretion by providing federal courts with
calculable tables for offense levels and criminal histories.51 Shortly
thereafter, mandatory minimums arrived: sentences mandated by Congress,
rather than by individual judges, requiring application of a specific
sentencing floor.52 Mirroring the Guidelines, mandatory minimums are
usually tied to a quantifiable element of a crime, such as the type of weapon
used, amount of money laundered, or volume of narcotics sold.53
To calculate a sentence under the Guidelines, a judge examines the
defendant’s relevant conduct to determine an offense level, incorporates any
mitigating factors, and then assigns a criminal history category to the
defendant.54 The intersection of an individual’s criminal history and offense
level on the Guidelines’ table provides the judge with a recommended
sentence in a range of months.55 Within this calculation, defendants may be
subject to sentencing enhancements, departures, or variances based on
elements of their offense behavior. Enhancements are increases in a
sentencing level due to prior history or certain elements of the defendant’s
offense.56 Alternatively, downward departures permit a judge to reduce a

46. See id. at 992; see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973).
47. See Doherty, supra note 43, at 994.
48. Id.
49. The subsequent rise in aggressive prosecution, mass incarceration, and their disparate
impact on communities of color is beyond the scope of this Note. For a more thorough
illustration of the United States’ extreme system of confinement, see WENDY SAWYER &
PETER WAGNER, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2020
(2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/RU5V-DC85].
50. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 2 (2020),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/
2020/202009_fed-sentencing-basics.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHY6-PEEE].
51. See id. at 60.
52. See Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety
Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1860–61 (1995).
53. See id. There are now several exceptions for mandatory minimum charges that
defendants may pursue. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
to U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Aug. 12, 2013); see also Safety
Valves, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, https://famm.org/our-work/u-scongress/safety-valves/ [https://perma.cc/HS6A-PK82] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
54. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 50, at 6.
55. See id. at 21–22.
56. See id. at 17 n.110, 26 n.140.
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defendant’s sentence calculation.57 Some downward departures are codified,
while others are permitted for broad categories of factors, including coercion,
duress, or diminished capacity.58 Variances are sentences outside the
Guidelines that a judge has the authority to issue based on an analysis of the
broad range of sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).59
Under this reformed approach, similarly situated defendants are,
theoretically, more likely to have consistent sentences, and judges are limited
in their consideration of personal characteristics.60
However, judicial discretion remains. In United States v. Booker,61 the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, so
long as a judge considers the range of sentencing factors enumerated in
§ 3553(a).62 The seven factors included in this section are broad, particularly
the factors that require a sentencing court to consider “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant,”63 “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct,”64 and “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to reflect the
seriousness of the offense.”65 So long as a sentencing judge justifies a
deviation on the record, courts are permitted to sentence below the
Guidelines if their assessment of the facts of the case and these § 3553(a)
factors support imposing a more lenient sentence.66 With this flexibility,
judges ultimately maintain the ability to enhance or reduce sentences to some
degree, albeit within broad confines.67
B. The Opportunity for Manipulation of Quantity-Based Guidelines
The combination of quantifiable sentencing, mandatory minimums, and
guideline advisory ranges created an overt opportunity for law enforcement
to strategically increase a suspect’s sentence.68 Because drug or weapon
sales are typically planned and consensual transactions, law enforcement can
alter these meetings to fit the needs of mandatory minimums or sentencing
enhancements.69 For example, federal agents posing as dealers have slashed
57. See id. at 29.
58. See id.; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.13 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2021).
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, PRIMER ON DEPARTURES AND
VARIANCES 42–44 (2021), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/
2021_Primer_Departure_Variance.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RPS-52Q5] (delineating the
difference between a downward departure and a below-Guidelines variance).
60. See Doherty, supra note 43, at 996.
61. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
62. See id. at 226.
63. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
64. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
65. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
66. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007) (describing the procedure by
which a judge may sentence below the Guidelines range).
67. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 50, at 28.
68. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1402–03.
69. See id. at 1403.
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the price of large quantities of narcotics, inducing a defendant to buy a high
volume.70 They have cajoled defendants into bringing weapons to the
transactions.71 And they have delayed arrest until the amount of drugs
bought or sold secured higher statutory penalties.72
There are only two codified downward departures that allow a judge to
independently account for this type of manipulation in their sentencing
decisions: U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual sections 5K2.12 and 2D1.1.
Section 5K2.12 permits a downward departure “[i]f the defendant committed
the offense because of serious coercion, blackmail or duress, under
circumstances not amounting to a complete defense.”73 Serious coercion is
ordinarily defined as physical injury or substantial damage to property;
desperate financial circumstances are insufficient.74 In a reverse sting
operation—where law enforcement sells drugs to a defendant—a judge may
also consider a downward departure under section 2D1.1 if the government
set a price for the controlled substance that was substantially below market
value, leading the defendant to purchase a greater quantity of the drug than
he otherwise could afford.75 The defendant has the burden of proof to raise
and substantiate these departures.76
Outside of these codified departures, a defendant may raise a sentencing
entrapment or sentencing manipulation defense at the sentencing phase.
Generally, the sentencing entrapment defense alleges that an undercover
officer encouraged the defendant to engage in a level of criminal activity he
otherwise would not have been involved in.77 On the other hand, a
sentencing manipulation defense alleges that an officer improperly enlarged
the scope of a crime to increase a defendant’s sentence under the
Guidelines.78 Both defenses seek the same outcome: a downward departure,
on the basis that the government played an active role in enhancing the
defendant’s conduct.79
Although popular with defendants, these defenses have an unsuccessful
track record.80 They have historically failed to provide defendants with
70. See United States v. Lora, 129 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81 (D. Mass. 2001) (describing how
the government reduced a down payment for a $1,137,500 purchase of sixty-five kilograms
of cocaine from $50,000 to $27,000).
71. See United States v. Abbott, 975 F. Supp. 703, 711 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
72. See Thompson v. McCullick, No. 2:16-cv-14353, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108497,
at *14 (E.D. Mich. June 28, 2019).
73. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.12 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
74. See id.
75. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 app. 27(A) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
2021).
76. See United States v. Gambino, 106 F.3d 1105, 1110 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Generally, under
the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant who seeks to take advantage of a sentencing
adjustment carries the burden of proof.”).
77. See Daniel L. Abelson, Comment, Sentencing Entrapment: An Overview and
Analysis, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 773, 780 (2003).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 776–78 (explaining statutory grounds for downward departures and the
rareness with which they are granted for sentencing entrapment defenses).
80. See id.
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sentencing relief due to federal courts’ strict treatment of these claims and
their reluctance to “exclude” manipulated behavior from a defendant’s
calculated offense level.81 Several circuit courts refuse to recognize these
defenses at all, precluding relief for individuals in those districts.82 In the
majority of cases invoking these claims, a defendant is nonetheless sentenced
according to the volume of narcotics, quantity of weapons, or number of
dollars the government coaxed him into offending with.83
1. Fake Stash Houses
The recent proliferation of fake stash house stings made clear that there is
a need for an improved sentencing argument to address manipulation of the
Guidelines.84 The example of twenty-two-year-old Dwayne White illustrates
the standard playbook for a fake stash house operation.85 In 2009, White
received a phone call from a friend with an offer to make money.86
According to the friend, there was a drug stash house nearby that contained
twenty to thirty kilograms of cocaine that they could steal and sell for profit.87
For White and his friend, both in difficult financial straits, the opportunity
seemed like a simple get-rich-quick scheme.88 White was a last-minute
addition to the plot, receiving the phone call mere hours before the robbery
was set to occur.89 Right before their attempt, the ringleader of the plot
verbally reminded them that there was a guaranteed volume of twenty to
thirty kilograms of cocaine in this house, and that they should plan to arrive
armed in case there were guards.90
The drugs, the house, and the need for weapons were a fabricated scheme
concocted by undercover federal agents.91 The amount of cocaine and the
weapons that informants encouraged White’s codefendants to bring were all
selected to align with mandatory minimums in the Guidelines.92 There was

81. For a more extensive discussion of court evaluation of these defenses, see infra Part
II.
82. See Abelson, supra note 77, at 776–78.
83. Id. at 776.
84. Rachel Poser, Stash-House Stings Carry Real Penalties for Fake Crimes, NEW
YORKER (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/10/18/stash-housestings-carry-real-penalties-for-fake-crimes [https://perma.cc/SRE9-9KMK]; see also
Katharine Tinto, Fighting the Stash House Sting, CHAMPION, Oct. 2014, at 16, 20–25
(encouraging defense attorneys to strengthen sentencing entrapment and manipulation claims
for stash house cases).
85. See United States v. White, No. 09 CR 687-4, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146891, at
*2–6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2021).
86. See Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 27.
87. See White, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146891, at *10; Sweeney & Meisner, supra note
27.
88. See Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 27.
89. See id.
90. See White, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146891, at *11; Sweeney & Meisner, supra note
27.
91. See United States v. Mayfield, No. 09 CR 0687, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106633, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2010).
92. See Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 27.
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no stash house, no drugs, and no potential for an actual crime to occur. That
did not matter—White received a twenty-five-year sentence for his role in
the scheme.93
White’s case is unexceptional in that it mirrored a common tactic of the
DEA and ATF. In each scheme, an informant or undercover agent
approached someone like White—a young, Black man in difficult financial
straits—and encouraged him to obtain weapons and recruit friends to rob a
fictional stash house.94 Federal prosecutors and these agents intentionally
selected drug, weapon, or cash amounts that corresponded to guideline
recommendations or mandatory minimum sentences.95 In Chicago, Illinois,
where White’s arrest occurred, the United States Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois prosecuted twenty stash-house stings between 2006 and
2013 involving ninety-four defendants: seventy-four were Black, twelve
were Latine, eight were white.96 In New York, 179 individuals were arrested
by the DEA over the course of ten years for their participation in these
schemes—not a single defendant was white.97 This reflects a broader pattern
of racial disparity for these traps in Los Angeles, Tampa, D.C., and other
cities where law enforcement focused stash house efforts in communities of
color.98
2. Evolution of the Stash House Sting
Early stash house cases raised the defenses of sentencing entrapment and
sentencing manipulation, but courts widely rejected them.99 For example, in
United States v. Sanchez,100 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the sentence of an individual subjected to a fake stash house
scheme and deemed the tactic a “common and more troublesome issue”
created by the government.101 The court recognized that the volume of fake
substances used to charge the defendant was tailored for sentencing, writing,
“the amount used for sentencing guideline purposes was the amount set by
93. See id.
94. See Alison Siegler & William Admussen, Discovering Racial Discrimination by the
Police, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 989 (2020).
95. See id.
96. See Report of Jeffrey Fagan, Ph.D. at 2, 15, United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d
976 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (No. 12-CR-0632-RC), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/report_
of_jeffrey_fagan.pdf. [https://perma.cc/2ADQ-96CU].
97. See Shayna Jacobs, 10 Years. 179 Arrests. No White Defendants. DEA Tactics Face
Scrutiny in New York., WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2019, 8:05 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/10-years-179-arrests-no-whitedefendants-dea-tactics-face-scrutiny-in-new-york/2019/12/14/f6462242-12ce-11ea-bf62eadd5d11f559_story.html [https://perma.cc/GXA2-J3DG].
98. See Poser, supra note 84; Victoria Kim, Jury Acquits L.A. Man Accused in ATF Drug
“Stash House” Case, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015, 3:36 PM), https://www.latimes.com/
local/lanow/la-me-ln-atf-stash-house-case-acquittal-20150410-story.html
[https://perma.cc/37Z4-5Q3E].
99. See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 637, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Ciszkowski, 492 F.3d 1264, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007).
100. 138 F.3d 1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1998).
101. Id.
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the government informant under direction from a government agent.”102
Nevertheless, as grounds to reject his defenses, the court pointed to the fact
that: (1) the defendant agreed to participate voluntarily, (2) the defendant
had his own vehicle and weapon he was willing to contribute, and (3) it is
legal and acceptable for federal authorities to use fake narcotics in their
operations and charge defendants as if those substances were real.103 Law
enforcement told Mr. Sanchez that there would be fifty kilograms of cocaine
and 300 pounds of marijuana in his stash house; this translated to a thirty-year
sentence of incarceration that the court upheld on appeal.104
Similar versions of this rationale played out in federal courts each time
defendants in stash house schemes challenged their sentences.105 Despite an
acknowledgment by courts that stash house cases are “troubling”106 and give
the government “unfettered ability to inflate the amount of drugs supposedly
in the house and thereby obtain a greater sentence for the defendant,”107
appellate courts rarely find that sentencing entrapment and manipulation
defenses are substantiated, for reasons discussed more thoroughly in Part
II.108
In 2015, a clinic led by Professor Alison Siegler at the University of
Chicago Law School tried a novel method for challenging fake stash house
cases.109 Professor Siegler’s Federal Criminal Justice Clinic (FCJC) filed
pretrial motions to dismiss for racially selective law enforcement on behalf
of forty Chicago defendants ensnared in twelve stash house operations.110
The filings alleged that the ATF discriminated on the basis of race when
selecting targets for the stash house schemes.111 The clinic coordinated cases
for a class action–type suit and brought a swath of racially coded data
collected from Chicago stash house cases that showed the clear,
disproportionate targeting of Black and Latine defendants.112 By showing
that nearly every defendant selected for one of these schemes was an
individual of color, the clinic sought to prove that the ATF was engaging in
selective enforcement.113 This is not a standard approach; selective
102. Id.
103. See id. at 1414–15.
104. See id. at 1412, 1417.
105. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 733 F.3d 294, 307 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the
sentencing defenses for a stash house scheme where defendants were found to be willing
participants); United States v. Yuman-Hernandez, 712 F.3d 471, 474–76 (9th Cir. 2013)
(expressing concern over the government’s ability to manipulate the defendant’s sentence but
upholding the sentence on predisposition grounds).
106. Black, 733 F.3d at 302.
107. United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010).
108. See infra Part II.B.
109. See Alison Siegler & Judith P. Miller, Federal Criminal Justice Clinic Moves to
Dismiss Cases Because ATF Discriminated on the Basis of Race, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH.
(Sept. 24, 2016), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/federal-criminal-justice-clinic-movesdismiss-cases-because-atf-discriminated-basis-race [https://perma.cc/D3SG-YAKN].
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
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enforcement claims have a remarkably unsuccessful track record due, in part,
to difficulties in obtaining discovery that would validate their claims.114
Prior to 2015, claimants in federal court alleging selective enforcement
were first required, at the discovery stage, to obtain internal law enforcement
documentation to substantiate their claims.115 To justify a request for
internal government documents related to racially selective tactics, a
claimant needed to point to evidence of discriminatory effect and
discriminatory intent.116 The discriminatory effect prong further required a
defendant to show that a “similarly situated” person of another race was not
selected for arrest because of his race.117 The discriminatory intent prong
demanded that the defendant present “some evidence” of discriminatory
intent on the part of the government.118 In essence, a defendant was asked to
produce firm evidence of white offenders who were not arrested, as well as
some evidence that race played a role in the selection of the defendant’s own
arrest.119 Both tasks are effectively impossible without access to the
government’s internal documents, which is often the exact discovery that a
claimant is trying to obtain.120
FCJC’s litigation sought to lower this discovery standard because it would
allow the clinic to obtain discovery about the ATF’s selection criteria,
criminal history data, and racial composition of the selected targets for stash
house stings.121 The clinic was successful: in United States v. Davis,122 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was persuaded by the FCJC’s
defendant data, which demonstrated an overwhelming targeting of Black
individuals for stash house schemes, and it became the first court of appeals
in the country to lower the discovery standard for defendants seeking
evidence in selective law enforcement claims.123
The decision prompted the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Ninth
Circuits to follow suit, eliminating the requirement that a claimant be
“similarly situated” and provide “some evidence” to show discriminatory
effect and intent.124 In a concurrence, Judge Jacqueline H. Nguyen of the
Ninth Circuit hypothesized that evidence of law enforcement’s targeting
114. See Siegler & Admussen, supra note 94, at 1002 (“Since the Court established
Armstrong’s demanding discovery standard, there has not been a single successful selective
prosecution or selective law enforcement claim on the merits.”). “Selective enforcement”
refers to a defense under the Equal Protection Clause, where the defendant alleges law
enforcement applied or enforced a law in a discriminatory manner. Id. at 991.
115. See id. at 990–93.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls
of Armstrong, 73 CHI. KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) (“[T]he similarly situated requirement
renders many meritorious claims impossible to prove.”).
121. Id.
122. 793 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
123. See Siegler & Admussen, supra note 94, at 1009–11.
124. See United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2018); United States v.
Washington, 869 F.3d 193, 216 (3d Cir. 2017).

2022]

SENTENCING AFTER STASH HOUSES

221

minority neighborhoods could, in and of itself, be proof of discriminatory
effect.125 Although the court created the new, lower standard in the context
of fake stash houses, it now also applies to any case where a criminal
defendant seeks discovery to support a claim of selective enforcement.126
This litigation drew significant attention to fake stash house cases across
the country.127 The FCJC’s motions to dismiss the charges against individual
defendants were denied, but the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of Illinois, in Chicago, made highly unusual plea offers to every
defendant in the suit, releasing most defendants after time served or
dismissing all of their remaining mandatory-minimum charges.128 The ATF
stopped bringing fake stash house cases in Chicago entirely.129 And district
judges did not mince words when reflecting on the clear racial discrimination
baked into the schemes. Chief Judge Rubén Castillo implored the
government to relegate fake stash houses to “the dark corridors of our past,”
writing, “[t]he inherent problems of this District’s false stash house cases
must be seen through the lens of our country’s sad history of racism.”130 In
another FCJC case, Judge Robert Gettleman issued a decision “express[ing]
[the] court’s disgust with the ATF’s conduct in this case.”131
C. Stash House Parallels in Lower-Level Manipulated Offenses
Stash house litigation was undoubtedly a success for the individuals
released from incarceration. But, there is a serious question of why it took
years, a team of lawyers funded by an elite law school, and hundreds of
motions to have the cases addressed.132 Sentencing entrapment and
manipulation defenses have existed for decades and should have been
perfectly suited for stash house cases where the substances were fake,
volumes completely arbitrary, and crimes impossible to commit.133 But,
these defenses were wholly inadequate in reducing the sentences of

125. See Sellers, 906 F.3d at 860–61 (Nguyen, J., concurring). Judge Nguyen wrote:
I question whether conducting stash house operations almost exclusively in
neighborhoods known to be [B]lack and Hispanic, and excluding neighborhoods
known to be white, is in fact a “facially neutral” policy . . . . Even if, for the sake of
argument, stash house robberies are more likely to be committed by persons of color
than by whites for reasons having nothing to do with race, limiting reverse stings to
minority neighborhoods will still result in the systematic overrepresentation of
minority targets.
Id. (citations omitted).
126. See Siegler & Admussen, supra note 94, at 1019.
127. See Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 27; Heath, supra note 28 (showing that 91 percent
of people incarcerated for ATF stash house stings were racial or ethnic minorities).
128. See Meisner, supra note 30.
129. See id.
130. United States v. Brown, 299 F. Supp. 3d 976, 983–85 (N.D. Ill 2018).
131. United States v. Paxton, No. 13 CR 0103, 2018 WL 4504160, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
20, 2018).
132. See supra note 109 (discussing the time and resources it took to undertake the Chicago
stash house litigation).
133. See Spakowski, supra note 37, at 504–14 (explaining why traditional sentencing
entrapment and manipulation claims are insufficient to address stash house schemes).

222

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91

individuals subjected to this manipulation.134 Relief relied on complex
litigation that is inaccessible to most defendants.135
Although stash house cases are disappearing due to judicial rebuke, several
documented instances of federal law enforcement tactics show that the ATF
or the DEA may still engage in similarly racist operations at a much broader
level, especially for lower-level narcotics or weapons offenses where
Guidelines manipulation is easiest.136 There is no national database that
catalogues federal law enforcement manipulation and displays whether it is
applied in a discriminatory manner.137 So although the following instances
are inconclusive, they illustrate standard techniques used in federal
enforcement efforts.138 These types of enforcement tactics are far more
common than stash house schemes ever were, and the rest of this Note
focuses on these cases, recognizing that they constitute the bulk of scenarios
where defendants traditionally raise sentencing entrapment and manipulation
claims.139
1. Sentencing Schemes in San Francisco and Albuquerque
In 2013, when the DEA partnered with the San Francisco Police
Department (SFPD) to address the drug trade in San Francisco, California,
every one of the thirty-seven individuals who were federally prosecuted as a
result of the joint operation were Black.140 The operation was called
“Operation Safe Schools” because most of the Tenderloin neighborhood,
where the efforts were concentrated, is within 1,000 feet of a school,
subjecting the defendants to a federal school zone enhancement for their
offenses.141 The joint law enforcement effort was intended to curb narcotics
dealings by subjecting arrested individuals to harsher federal sentencing than
134. See id.
135. See supra note 109.
136. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1445–49.
137. This is, in part, due to the dearth of public law enforcement or prosecutorial data that
illustrates which individuals are subject to a ratcheted sentence. See NICOLE ZAYAS FORTIER,
ACLU, UNLOCKING THE BLACK BOX: HOW THE PROSECUTORIAL TRANSPARENCY ACT WILL
EMPOWER COMMUNITIES AND HELP END MASS INCARCERATION 8–12 (2019),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/aclu_smart_justice_prosecutor_trans
parency_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD8U-WPB9] (describing the difficult nature of
obtaining data on prosecutorial decision-making). The best illustrative data may also be
scattered across various public defenders’ offices, which cannot disclose such information for
confidentiality reasons and do not have the resources to maintain massive databases. See
Jennifer E. Laurin, Data and Accountability in Indigent Defense, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373,
373–75 (2017).
138. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1411–12.
139. See id.
140. See Ezekiel Edwards & Shilpi Agarwal, Racist Drug Laws Lead to Racist
Enforcement in Cities Across the Country, ACLU (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/racist-drug-laws-lead-to-racist-enforcementin-cities-across-the-country/ [https://perma.cc/CB4Q-6357]; Max Cherney, SFPD at Odds
with Feds After Taking Blame for Racist Drug Busts, HOODLINE (Feb. 26, 2017),
https://hoodline.com/2017/02/sfpd-at-odds-with-feds-after-taking-blame-for-race-baseddrug-busts/ [https://perma.cc/WJ35-JK6C].
141. See Cherney, supra note 140.
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they otherwise would receive under state sentencing.142 Undercover officers
or confidential informants walked through the Tenderloin district and
repeatedly purchased small volumes of drugs from suspects.143 According
to a subsequent civil lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), body-worn camera footage of the undercover purchases showed the
officers ignoring persons of other races to approach Black suspects, and in
one recording, an officer was heard using racial epithets to describe the
operation’s targets.144
In 2016, the ATF initiated similar drug-buying operations in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, by using confidential informants to persuade individuals to
find and purchase drugs across the city.145 The operation used five
confidential informants—three Black and two Latine individuals—placed in
racially marginalized neighborhoods to find targets to persuade.146 The
informants typically approached individuals and offered a “finder’s fee,” a
small amount of cash, in return for locating a source of drugs or weapons.147
The informant, or a partnering undercover agent, selected the amount of
drugs they wanted to buy or the number of purchases to be undertaken.148
After successfully arranging the purchases, police arrested the “finding”
individual and charged them with conspiracy to distribute the type of
substance they located.149 An independent study found that 27 percent of
those arrested were Black and 57 percent were Latine—in a city with a
3 percent Black population and 47 percent Latine population.150 In the
decade prior to those operations, Black individuals comprised just 5 percent
of drug and gun defendants in New Mexico federal court.151 The study also
found that many of the individuals targeted were unhoused and lacked the
violent criminal histories that the ATF stated they used as a prerequisite for
targeting.152 The same report noted that two of the ATF agents involved in
the Albuquerque operations worked in the stash house schemes in Chicago
several years prior.153
These statistics reflect a broader phenomenon where law enforcement
weaponizes the Guidelines in small narcotics and weapons purchases and

142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See Cross v. City of San Francisco, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1150 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
145. Jeff Proctor, Feds’ Sting Ensnared Many ABQ Blacks, Not “Worst of the Worst,”
N.M. IN DEPTH (May 7, 2017), https://nmindepth.com/2017/05/07/feds-sting-ensnared-manyabq-blacks-not-worst-of-the-worst/ [https://perma.cc/AYH7-VY6L].
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Jeff Proctor, Black Community Wants Answers on ATF’s Albuquerque Sting, Says
It Was “Punch in the Face,” N.M. POL. REP. (June 13, 2017), https://nmpoliticalreport.com/
2017/06/13/black-community-wants-answers-on-atfs-albuquerque-sting-says-it-was-punchin-the-face/ [https://perma.cc/R7UF-B84V].
152. See id.
153. See Proctor, supra note 145.
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intentionally trains its efforts on racially marginalized communities.154 Such
selective methods are concerning not only because entrapment-style tactics
raise ethical concerns, but also because these actions may contribute to
existing sentencing disparities as prosecutors charge defendants of color with
higher volumes of substances, or enhancements, than their white
counterparts.155 This effect is difficult to measure because of inadequate data
showing the discretionary decisions of law enforcement.156 However,
broader analyses of sentencing disparities by race consistently show
disproportionate harshness toward Black and Latine defendants.157
2. Racialized by Design
The technicalities of undercover work play a role in these selective
enforcement patterns. Because undercover purchases or arrangements are
police-initiated, agents or confidential informants select particular places and
particular people for their investigations.158 Searching for targets in
socioeconomically depressed neighborhoods tends to be both more
successful and more affordable because those areas are more likely to include
street transactions than sales in private homes.159 Because of historical
disenfranchisement, drug transactions in neighborhoods composed of
communities of color may be more likely to occur between strangers in
public places rather than between acquaintances in bars, clubs, or houses.160
The former type of operation is easier to penetrate, consumes fewer
resources, and is less likely to garner negative attention.161
Confidential informants also play an important role in enabling this racial
tilt.162 Informants are critical in enforcement tactics that rely on covert
purchases.163 Informants are typically members of the targeted community
themselves or are already implicated in some criminal activity, making their
presence unsuspicious.164 In a sentencing scheme, informants often initiate
154. See, e.g., Edwards & Agarwal, supra note 140.
155. See, e.g., Controlled Substances: Federal Policies and Enforcement: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security, 117th Cong. 17–19 (2021)
(statement of Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law and Director, Federal Criminal Justice
Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School) (calling for the abolition of harsh drug laws
and mandatory minimums and citing the lack of tangible reform that addresses these
sentencing practices’ racial disparities).
156. See Wiseman, supra note 36, at 350–54.
157. See generally Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Racial Disparity in Federal Criminal
Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1321–24 (2014) (showing racial disparities in federal
sentencing for the most common categories of offenses).
158. See William J. Stuntz, Essay, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1820
(1998).
159. See id.
160. See id. at 1803.
161. See id. at 1820.
162. Id. at 1821–22.
163. See Alan Feuer & Al Baker, Officers’ Arrests Put Spotlight on Police Use of
Informants, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/nyregion/
27informants.html [https://perma.cc/9NJW-6YCR].
164. See id.
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contact with someone they believe is already engaged in criminal activity or
recruit someone willing to participate.165 The race of the confidential
informant can thus be determinative of who they will report or select for their
efforts.166 Informants are more likely to operate in their own neighborhoods
and initiate contact with individuals of their same race because of community
social dynamics.167 There is the potential for a cyclical “blinders effect” in
these situations: if police believe criminal activity is more likely to occur in
neighborhoods composed of people of color, they will recruit informants who
can operate in those neighborhoods, who will in turn select and recruit
individuals of their same demographics.168 This series of events rewards the
police’s initial bias.169
Given the nature of informant work, demographic data on confidential
informants and their selection techniques are limited.170 But, as noted in the
subsequent lawsuit challenging selective enforcement in Albuquerque, every
confidential informant selected for that city’s operations was Black or Latine,
which narrowed the ATF’s focus to demographically similar individuals.171
When an ATF agent from the Albuquerque stings was cross-examined on
this exact issue, he admitted there were zero materials or efforts related to
antibias in planning the scheme, and when asked about the recruitment of
informants, responded, “[f]or the most part, I don’t even ask what their race
is.”172 Further, when asked about any implicit or explicit bias training that
the informants or assigned ATF agents received, the agent testified there had
been none.173 In response to critiques that his sting operations brought in an
excessive number of individuals of color, the agent responded, “we’re
colorblind, we’re race blind . . . we’re race neutral.”174

165. See Proctor, supra note 145 (interviewing Professor Katharine Tinto on the
discriminatory use of confidential informants).
166. See id.
167. See JUDITH GREENE & PATRICIA ALLARD, ACLU OF MISS. & JUST. STRATEGIES,
NUMBERS GAME: THE VICIOUS CYCLE OF INCARCERATION IN MISSISSIPPI’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 44–45 (2011), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/DLRP_
MississipppiReport_sm.pdf [https://perma.cc/GLL2-YYBZ].
168. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Wrongly Accused Redux: How Race Contributes to Convicting
the Innocent: The Informants Example, 37 SW. U. L. REV. 101, 136–37 (2008) (describing the
“blinders effect” and explaining racial disparities in warrants issued on the basis of
confidential informants’ tips in San Diego, California).
169. See id.
170. See Green & Allard, supra note 167, at 29.
171. See Jeff Proctor, ATF Used Traveling, Well-Paid Informants in ABQ Sting, N.M. IN
DEPTH (May 15, 2017), https://nmindepth.com/2017/05/15/atf-used-traveling-well-paidinformants-in-abq-sting/ [https://perma.cc/H6EY-GTJL].
172. United States v. Jackson, No. 16-CR-2362, 2018 WL 6602226, at *10 (D.N.M. Dec.
17, 2018).
173. See id.
174. Id.
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D. Sentencing as Opportunity for Advocacy
A defendant in a sentencing scheme has limited options for challenging his
charge.175 At the pretrial stage, he may raise a selective enforcement claim
that argues that he was unfairly targeted on the basis of race.176 However, as
shown by the Chicago stash house cases, these claims are exceptionally
difficult to win, even with the lower discovery standards recently established
in several circuits.177 Stash house defendants have yet to prevail solely on
grounds of a selective enforcement or prosecution claim.178 Defendants
subject to lower-level manipulated offenses have had similar difficulty in
raising these challenges. In San Francisco and Albuquerque, selective
enforcement suits have not yet been successful.179
At the trial stage, the entrapment defense is also difficult to win.180 Pure
entrapment claims have a set of arduous standards and typically do not
inquire into bias factors or whether the race of the defendant played a role in
his entrapment.181 The entrapment defense also may not be appropriate for
sentencing schemes that are focused on the magnitude of the offense, not the
offense itself; these cases will inherently have well-documented evidence or
repeated transactions that illustrate a willingness to comply.182 And, today’s
criminal legal system is defined by plea bargaining, a process that attaches
serious penalties to taking the risk of proceeding to trial.183 Very few
defendants are willing to gamble on the likelihood of a trial victory,
particularly if there is a more attractive plea bargain offered.184
Finally, at the sentencing stage, a defendant may raise a sentencing
entrapment or manipulation defense that challenges the government for
guiding him toward an enhancement or using high volumes of substances in
175. See Tinto, supra note 84 (describing options for defense attorneys in challenging
manipulation cases).
176. See McAdams, supra note 120, at 605–07.
177. See Siegler & Admussen, supra note 94, at 1018–19 (discussing the lower discovery
standard achieved for selective enforcement claims but noting this has not yet resulted in
success of those claims).
178. See id.; supra Part I.B.1.
179. See Cross v. City of San Francisco, 386 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(granting San Francisco defendants’ selective enforcement discovery requests but rejecting
selective prosecution claims); United States v. Laneham, No. CIV 16-2930, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 176486, at *97 (D.N.M. Oct. 25, 2017) (rejecting an Albuquerque defendant’s
selective enforcement claim).
180. See generally Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Entrapment, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1389,
1390–93 (2004) (describing the difficulties of raising an effective entrapment defense); Susan
R. Klein, Aleza S. Remis & Donna Lee Elm, Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An
Empirical and Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 75 (2015) (citing available
statistics showing that 97 percent of federal criminal charges and 94 percent of state criminal
felony convictions were settled by guilty plea).
181. See Joh, supra note 6, at 194–96.
182. See Witten, supra note 11, at 730.
183. See, e.g., The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right to Trial on the Verge of
Extinction and How to Save It, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (July 10, 2018),
https://www.nacdl.org/Document/TrialPenaltySixthAmendmentRighttoTrialNearExtinct
[https://perma.cc/2C6C-HLHB].
184. See id.
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his individual case.185 Although this is successful in rare instances, as the
next part discusses, these defenses typically preclude the defendant from
arguing that his race played any role in the offense.186 This reflects a legal
norm that sentencing hearings should focus on the individual and his offense,
rather than on racial equity concerns.187
Despite these challenges, there is an opportunity to use sentencing hearings
as a platform to challenge racial disparities in sentencing schemes.188 As
codified, the Guidelines do not permit judges to use race or other immutable
characteristics as grounds for consideration in sentencing.189 However,
courts are required to evaluate any aggravating or mitigating sentencing
factors, and they increasingly rely on data or “evidence-based” materials to
determine an appropriate sentence.190 Further, the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not apply at sentencing, giving defendants and their attorneys a broad
opportunity to introduce information, hearsay, and narratives that would
otherwise be excluded at trial.191 For defendants, this has translated into
sentencing arguments ranging from discussing local prison conditions to
arguing that mass incarceration or the nation’s racialized “drug wars” warrant
leniency at sentencing.192
These arguments often speak to a sentencing judge’s ability to issue a
downward variance from a Guidelines sentence, because sentencing judges,
post-Booker, must consider whether the seven factors outlined in § 3553(a)
support the calculated Guidelines sentence.193 This includes an evaluation
of the “nature and circumstances of the offense,”194 the need for the sentence
“to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense,”195 and whether there is a “need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”196 For example, in

185. See infra Part II.A.
186. See infra Part II.A.
187. See Lindsey Webb, Slave Narratives and the Sentencing Court, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 125, 136 (2018) (“Judges have not typically used the autonomy and flexibility
of sentencing and sentencing hearings to consider or address broader questions of mass
incarceration or racial inequities. Instead, sentencing hearings are generally focused on the
specifics of the individual defendant, crime, and victim.”).
188. See id. at 127.
189. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
190. Webb, supra note 187, at 134–35.
191. See id. at 134.
192. See id. at 143–48; see also Timothy J. Droske, Correcting Native American
Sentencing Disparity Post-Booker, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 727 (2008) (arguing that
sentencing courts, post-Booker, have the opportunity to engage in sentencing correction for
Native American defendants).
193. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 49–50 (2007) (describing the factors a sentencing judge must consider under Booker’s
holding that the Guidelines are advisory); see also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 59, at
42–44 (describing the circumstances under which federal courts issued downward variances).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
195. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
196. Id. § 3553(a)(6).
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United States v. Dayi,197 a Maryland district court issued significant
downward variances for defendants in a marijuana distribution ring in
recognition of the fact that governmental policies toward marijuana have
significantly changed, and the selective enforcement of marijuana offenses
could lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities.198 The decision was
grounded in the § 3553(a) sentencing factors that the court was mandated to
consider—the court cited § 3553(a)(2)(A), which calls for a sentence to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, as well as § 3553(a)(6), which calls for
a sentence to avoid imposing unwarranted sentencing disparities.199
Similarly, in Kimbrough v. United States,200 the Supreme Court held that
§ 3553(a)(6) justified a substantial downward variance in cases that
implicated the infamous crack/powder cocaine sentencing ratio on the basis
that it promotes an unwarranted sentencing disparity.201 Previously, the
Guidelines treated every gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to 100 grams
of powder cocaine for sentencing purposes, a decision traceable to racialized
fears that motivated the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.202 The Kimbrough
Court held that it was properly within any sentencing court’s § 3553(a)
discretion to deviate from the 100-to-1 ratio prescribed by the Guidelines if
it believed that doing so would better ensure sentencing fairness and
consistency.203 In another important opinion supporting the use of discretion
under the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the Supreme Court held in Gall v.
United States204 that a downward sentencing variance did not need to be
justified by “extraordinary circumstances” but must display a thorough
consideration of the seven § 3553(a) factors.205
There are many factors still outside a sentencing court’s control:
prosecutors’ charging decisions, plea bargain stipulations, and mandatory
minimum charges continue to limit discretion.206 Most empirical evidence
indicates that the Guidelines are still highly influential on a judge’s

197. 980 F. Supp. 2d 682 (D. Md. 2013).
198. See id. at 687–89.
199. See id. at 683.
200. 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
201. Id. at 108–10 (“Under this instruction, district courts must take account of sentencing
practices in other courts and the ‘cliffs’ resulting from the statutory mandatory minimum
sentences. To reach an appropriate sentence, these disparities must be weighed against the
other § 3553(a) factors and any unwarranted disparity created by the crack/powder ratio
itself.”).
202. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see, e.g., United States v. Maske, 840 F. Supp. 151, 152 n.3 (D.D.C. 1993) (noting
that, if the defendant had possessed the equivalent volume of powder cocaine, rather than
crack, his sentence would have been one-fifth of what it was); DEBORAH J. VAGINS & JESSELYN
MCCURDY, ACLU, CRACKS IN THE SYSTEM: TWENTY YEARS OF THE UNJUST FEDERAL CRACK
COCAINE LAW 2–4 (2006), https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/drugpolicy/cracksinsystem_
20061025.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NUV-QPQQ] (discussing public fears and presumptions
surrounding crack cocaine use in the 1980s).
203. See Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 111.
204. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
205. See id. at 45, 53–56.
206. See Webb, supra note 187, at 135.
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decision-making.207 However, sentencing hearings provide one of the only
opportunities for defendants to address racial injustice in their cases and to
build a narrative that is both factually and emotionally persuasive.208 Booker
and its progeny restored some judicial independence in sentencing, further
making it possible to better address disparities in the criminal system at
sentencing hearings.209
II. THE CHAOTIC DOCTRINES OF SENTENCING ENTRAPMENT AND
SENTENCING MANIPULATION
This Note argues that, for individuals caught in manipulated sentencing
schemes, a stronger case for sentence leniency could be made by using stash
house cases as precedent to argue for a downward variance under the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors.210 This argument emphasizes that manipulated
Guidelines do not accurately reflect the nature and seriousness of an offense
under §§ 3553(a)(1)–(2) and lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities that
are discouraged by § 3553(a)(6).
This part discusses the legal doctrines of sentencing entrapment and
sentencing manipulation, the traditional arguments made at sentencing in
these cases, and why they rarely offer adequate protections for defendants.
Part II.A presents a hypothetical manipulation scenario and examines each
circuit court’s treatment of the hypothetical to illustrate the evaluation of
these defenses. Part II.B discusses the justifications for courts’ treatment of
these defenses and explains some of the critiques levied against the standards
used to evaluate each defense.
A. An Illustration
Two basic evaluations underline a court’s approach to sentencing
entrapment and manipulation claims: a “subjective test” that focuses on the
predisposition and intent of the defendant and an “objective test” that focuses
on the government’s conduct and manipulation.211 For courts that
distinguish between sentencing entrapment and manipulation, the former
typically triggers a subjective analysis, whereas a sentencing manipulation
claim triggers an objective analysis.212 Even within these generalities, courts
are inconsistent in their approaches. Jurisdictions utilizing an objective
approach have looked to a defendant’s predisposition, borrowing from the

207. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING 5 (2012), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2012-booker/Part_A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L4VZ-PLYL] (“During the Gall period, 80.7 percent of federal sentences
were either within the guideline range (53.9% of sentences) or below the range pursuant to a
government motion (26.8% of sentences).”).
208. See Webb, supra note 187, at 141–42.
209. See id. at 135–37.
210. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
211. See Abelson, supra note 77, at 781.
212. Id. at 781–84.
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subjective approach.213 Several courts merge the inquiries, treating
sentencing entrapment and manipulation as the same defense and using some
combination of objective and subjective factors to evaluate the claim.214
Three circuits refuse to consider the defenses at all, declining to inquire into
law enforcement discretion.215 These inconsistencies make a concise
summary impossible, but an illustration may help.
Take the common example of an unknowing suspect asked by an
undercover agent to procure and sell him narcotics.216 The suspect complies
and deals small volumes of the drug of choice to that agent several times over
the course of a year. After the cumulative volume the defendant sells is
comfortably over the 100-gram statutory minimum that triggers a five-year
prison term, the agent arrests him.217
At sentencing, the defendant seeks to raise two claims: (1) if not for the
officer’s coercion and payment, he would never have sold that volume of
drugs and (2) it is clear that the agent delayed his arrest until a five-year
sentence was guaranteed under the Guidelines, even though the intervention
could have happened at any point that year. The following two sections
analyze how each claim would be examined in federal circuit courts.
1. Sentencing Entrapment
The first claim would be deemed a sentencing entrapment defense in most
circuits.218 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Eighth, Ninth, and District of
Columbia Circuits apply a subjective analysis to these claims, requiring the
defendant to show that he was not predisposed to engage in that volume of
narcotics dealing without the agent’s encouragement, or that he would not
have had the resources to engage in that activity.219 If successful, the court
would exclude the volume of “induced” narcotics from the defendant’s
offense-level calculations or reduce their sentence in a discretionary way.220
To refute this defense, the government may point to prior drug convictions

213. See, e.g., United States v. Kenney, 756 F.3d 36, 51 (1st Cir. 2014). The inquiry for
sentencing manipulation used by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit purports to
focus objectively on the government’s conduct during the manipulated scheme. See id. But,
in Kenney, the First Circuit rejected a defendant’s sentencing manipulation defense based on
the district court’s finding that the defendant was an “enthusiastic participant” in the scheme.
Id. In that instance, the ATF ensnared the defendant in a fake stash house scheme, arbitrarily
increasing the stash amount from $100,000 to $200,000 plus five kilograms of cocaine before
the staged robbery, resulting in a ten-year Guidelines sentence. See id.
214. See Abelson, supra note 77, at 781–84.
215. See infra note 227.
216. See, e.g., Quinones-Figueroa v. United States, No. 12-CV-2230-T-27, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 69324, at *26 (M.D. Fla. May 15, 2013); United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013 (10th
Cir. 2009).
217. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(i).
218. See Abelson, supra note 77, at 779.
219. See United States v. McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2016); United States
v. Boykin, 785 F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d 762,
773–74 (8th Cir. 2006).
220. See Ruiz, 446 F.3d at 774.
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or behavior that implies that the defendant was, in fact, predisposed to that
degree of drug activity.221
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit diverges from this
pattern and applies an objective analysis, requiring the defendant to show that
the government engaged in “outrageous official conduct” that overcame his
will to resist the criminal activity.222 This is a high bar; the court has never
recognized a single case that meets that standard.223
The Third Circuit has never explicitly ruled on the validity of either a
sentencing entrapment or manipulation defense but has held that there would
not be grounds for departure from the Guidelines if agents intentionally
stretch out an operation, leading a defendant to greater sentencing
penalties.224 Recently citing a defendant’s “willingness to participate” in a
sting drug trafficking operation, the court dismissed the opportunity to rule
on the legal merits of either defense.225 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit follows the Third Circuit in declining to recognize the legal
viability of a sentencing entrapment claim.226 The U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits offer even less clarity, declining to
rule on the merits of either a sentencing entrapment or manipulation
defense.227 The defendant in this illustration is unlikely to proceed on his
claim in any of these circuits.
2. Sentencing Manipulation
The defendant’s second claim in the above illustration—that the agent
purposefully delayed his arrest to secure a five-year sentence under the
Guidelines—is a sentencing manipulation defense. The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First and Tenth Circuits treat sentencing entrapment and
manipulation as equivalents, but every circuit that recognizes some version
of the manipulation defense applies an objective analysis.228 Under an
objective analysis, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the government exhibited “extraordinary misconduct” in the
offense.229 Showing that the government concocted the idea for the crime
221. See e.g, United States v. Jennings, No. 17-264, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151963, at *8
(D. Minn. Aug. 12, 2021).
222. United States v. Soborski, 708 F. App’x 6, 10 (2d Cir. 2017).
223. See id. at 10.
224. See United States v. Baird, No. 20-2262, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 24314, at *5 (3d Cir.
Aug. 16, 2021).
225. See id. at *5–6.
226. See United States v. Young, 818 F. App’x 185, 195 (4th Cir. 2020).
227. See United States v. Zuniga-Medrano, 778 F. App’x 329, 330 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We
have not decided whether sentencing entrapment or sentencing factor manipulation is a viable
defense, and we need not do so here.” (citing United States v. Stephens, 717 F.3d 440, 446
(5th Cir. 2013))); United States v. Hammadi, 737 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[O]ur circuit does not recognize the
sentencing manipulation doctrine.”).
228. See Abelson, supra note 77, at 781–84.
229. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v.
Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994)); see also Adams v. United States, No. 06 Cr. 218,
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itself, could have ceased the conduct earlier, or steered the defendant toward
satisfying a guideline minimum, is insufficient.230 The high volume of
narcotics, even if obviously corresponding to a guideline sentence, is
typically irrelevant to the analysis without more evidence of intolerable
pressure or illegitimate motive by the agent involved.231 The defendant in
the above illustration would only find relief if he could show that law
enforcement acted with extraordinary misconduct that was “sufficiently
reprehensible.”232
The D.C. Circuit recently decided a rare, successful sentencing
manipulation case that illustrates where this standard lies. In United States
v. Hopkins,233 undercover officers proposed that the defendant rob a liquor
store, meeting with him several times to plan the robbery.234 At one of those
meetings, an undercover officer handed the defendant and his coconspirators
guns to use in the robbery.235 The officers arrested the defendants shortly
after they held the weapons for a few minutes.236 Upon sentencing, the court
rejected a sentencing entrapment defense on the grounds that Hopkins and
codefendants were perfectly comfortable planning the robbery and using
weapons in its commission, satisfying predisposition.237 But the court held
that the district court properly reduced Hopkins’s sentence on manipulation
grounds, noting that the weapons were obviously placed in the defendants’
hands to enhance their sentences, and that they were unlikely to have been
able to obtain those weapons themselves.238 Nonetheless, Hopkins was still
sentenced to seventy-two months for his participation in an orchestrated
crime that did not, and could not, have occurred.239
B. Justifications for the Sentencing Defenses
Though federal courts’ treatment of these sentencing defenses is somewhat
erratic, the defendant in the initial illustration is unlikely to find relief on
either of his claims. The two standards in place for evaluating these
defenses—predisposition and outrageous conduct—are heavily relied on by
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30012, at *46 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2013); United States v. Beltran, 571
F.3d 1013, 1018–19 (10th Cir. 2009).
230. See Montoya, 62 F.3d at 3–4 (“A defendant cannot make out a case of undue
provocation simply by showing that the idea originated with the government, or that the
conduct was encouraged by it, or that the crime was prolonged beyond the first criminal act
or exceeded in degree or kind what the defendant had done before.” (citations omitted)).
231. See United States v. Pérez-Vásquez, 6 F.4th 180, 204 (1st Cir. 2021) (declining a
downward departure in a case where the government provided five kilograms of cocaine to
each defendant). Though five kilograms of cocaine triggers a ten-year sentence under
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(I), the Pérez-Vásquez court declined to grant the defendants’
sentencing manipulation claims). Id.
232. United States v. Gallardo, 977 F.3d 1126, 1144 (11th Cir. 2020).
233. 715 F. App’x 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
234. See id.
235. See United States v. McKeever, 824 F.3d 1113, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
236. See id.
237. See Hopkins, 715 F. App’x at 22.
238. See id.
239. See id.
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courts but face significant critiques.240 The following section discusses the
rationale and criticisms of the high bar for these defenses. Part II.B.1
examines predisposition for the subjective test, and Part II.B.2 examines
outrageous government conduct under the objective test.
1. Predisposition
The subjective test’s “predisposition” inquiry stems from the analysis
given to a pure entrapment defense.241 To determine if a defendant is
predisposed to commit an offense at a certain level, a court examines his state
of mind and inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents.242
The goal of this examination is to distinguish between a ready and able
criminal and an innocent person ensnared by government coercion.243
As with any intent inquiry, an exact understanding of the defendant’s mind
at the moment of the offense is impossible. Predisposition analyses
maneuver around this impossibility by typically examining two factors:
(1) prompt acquiescence or participation in the government’s proposed
criminal activity and (2) the individual’s criminal history and behavior prior
to the offense.244 By looking at an individual’s “willingness” to engage in
criminal activity, proponents of this approach argue that a subjective analysis
easily separates ready and able criminals from innocent victims caught in a
government-induced scheme.245 And, a common argument follows that a
truly reasonable, innocent person would not eagerly participate in a crime at
all, particularly one that involves several transactions and presents many
opportunities to walk away.246
Critics of the subjective approach highlight the circular nature of this
argument. First, using predisposition to determine culpability allows
significant room for sentencing stereotyping and prejudice, given that the
inquiry is centered on intangible notions of willingness and history.247
Second, raising a sentencing entrapment defense in a subjective jurisdiction
240. See, e.g., Tinto, supra note 1, at 1417.
241. See Dru Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 71–72
(2005).
242. See Davis v. State, 570 So. 2d 791, 793 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (summarizing the
standard legal definition of predisposition); see also United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
429 (1973).
243. See Davis, 570 So. 2d at 793.
244. See Stevenson, supra note 241, at 67, 71; see also United States v. Reyes, 239 F.3d
722, 739 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Other factors that may tend to prove predisposition include desire
for profit; demonstrated knowledge or experience with the criminal activity under
investigation; the character of the defendant, including past criminal history; whether the
government first suggested criminal activity; and the nature of the inducement offered by the
government.”); United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 842 (2d Cir. 1982) (“Prompt
acquiescence shows predisposition to accept a bribe, whether or not a promise of official
action is intended to be kept.”); United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(“Clearly, one way of proving predisposition is to show that the defendant responded
affirmatively to less than compelling inducement by the government agent.”).
245. See Stevenson, supra note 241, at 48.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 48–49.
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may draw attention to the defendant’s prior bad acts or criminal history and
result in more scrutiny of the individual’s character rather than the
government’s conduct.248 Together, these two factors give law enforcement
significant incentive to target individuals with prior convictions in their
undercover operations, giving law enforcement an opportunity to argue that
a predisposition exists.249
The subjective test may also create more room for racial prejudice, given
its analysis of criminal history.250 It is now better recognized that the past
decades’ drug wars caused tremendous damage to communities of color and
levied harsher sentences on Black and Latine individuals.251 This left
thousands of individuals with prior criminal histories that today would have
been shorter, dismissed, or diverted.252 Criminal history often speaks more
to the legacy of policing and race than it does to an individual’s propensity
for criminal behavior.253 Yet, for sentencing purposes, lengthier criminal
history is grounds for a higher offense level, leading to a higher Guidelines
sentence.254
For federal agencies conducting sentencing schemes,
individuals with prior criminal records make easier targets because they will
automatically receive higher sentences under the Guidelines and satisfy a
predisposition analysis.255 From the government’s perspective, it is far easier
to argue that a defendant’s offense was not manipulated or escalated if he has
a record that indicates prior involvement in criminal activity.256
2. Outrageous Government Conduct
Examining whether an officer or agent’s actions constituted “extraordinary
misconduct” stems from the due process–based outrageous government
conduct claim.257 This is a vague standard rooted in dicta from the Supreme
Court case United States v. Russell.258 No federal court has strictly defined
the contours of an outrageous conduct claim, with most reiterating that the
relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the
government’s conduct is so “shocking, outrageous and clearly intolerable”

248.
249.
250.
251.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 48 n.127.
See JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK
AMERICA 17–18 (2017).
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 50, at 26.
255. See Witten, supra note 11, at 727–28 (describing how a predisposition analysis often
punishes “smaller” offenders by incentivizing law enforcement to target individuals with prior
records).
256. See id.
257. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1410.
258. 411 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1973) (“[W]e may some day be presented with a situation in
which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a
conviction.”).
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that it offends “the universal sense of justice.”259 The cited reasoning for
such a high standard is “due in primary part to the reluctance of the judiciary
to second-guess the motives and tactics of law enforcement officials.”260 A
finding of outrageous conduct is typically reserved for the most egregious
and rare situations—a defendant rarely succeeds in reducing his sentence on
this claim.261
Circuit courts typically justify this high bar by citing the necessity of
offering broad discretion to the undercover activities of law enforcement,
writing that “[c]ourts should go very slowly before staking out rules that will
deter government agents from the proper performance of their investigative
duties.”262 The judiciary’s hesitance to admonish sting operations stems
from respect for the notion that agents may draw out an offense to catch a
“bigger fish” or more senior offenders in the scheme, and that sting
operations are reliable methods for law enforcement to probe the contours of
a conspiracy and better establish a case beyond a reasonable doubt.263
Courts also acknowledge that undercover techniques are designed to
overcome difficult detection problems in transactional crimes.264
Investigations into ongoing drug or weapons purchases, money laundering
schemes, or trafficking operations are police-initiated, rather than
victim-initiated.265 Law enforcement must rely on surveillance and
“buy-and-bust” tactics to make arrests in these cases rather than wait for a
victim to come forward.266 It may take repeated transactions or a high payout
to induce individuals to get involved in the scheme.267 And, because the
evaluation of outrageous government conduct stems from a trial-based
complete defense, courts often approach the analysis with an “all-or-nothing”
lens, allowing for no subtleties or degrees of culpability—judges look for
only the most egregious behavior.268
Judges may also be reluctant to grant defendants sentencing relief when it
is difficult to describe what type of reduction is warranted.269 Notions of
fairness and justice are difficult for courts to construe in the world of
undercover work and criminal activity.270 Is it “outrageous” for law
enforcement to use five kilograms of narcotics in a sting arrest, but perfectly

259. United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)); Tinto, supra note 1, at 1410.
260. United States v. Lacey, 86 F.3d 956, 964 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484, 495–96 n.7 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that
enforcement officials “must be allowed flexibility adequate to counter effectively [narcotics]
activity”)).
261. See Spakowski, supra note 37, at 471–72.
262. United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 196 (1st Cir. 1992).
263. See United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1994).
264. See Joh, supra note 6, at 163–65.
265. See id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. Id. at 174.
269. See id.
270. See id.
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valid to use one?271 Is a sentencing hearing the correct venue for theorizing
what crime a defendant could have committed, absent police involvement?272
Judges often express the view that there is a line between acceptable coercion
and unfair manipulation but are reluctant to define the scope of acceptable
law enforcement behavior.273
Since the introduction of the Guidelines and its opportunities for
quantity-based manipulation, academics have questioned the ethics of this
judicial deference to the government’s ability to amplify an offense level.274
Police magnification of a crime may have negative implications for the
perceived legitimacy of law enforcement.275 This, in turn, diminishes public
confidence in law enforcement, particularly in communities historically
subject to police brutality, racial profiling, and negative relationships with
law enforcement.276
C. Consideration Under the § 3553(a) Factors
Traditionally, with a sentencing entrapment or manipulation defense,
defendants request removal of an enhancement or a lower calculated offense
level.277 This is a rational argument when there is a clearly defined
illustration of how an agent manipulated an individual—steering him toward
a school zone or handing him an automatic weapon as opposed to a handgun,
for example.278 This is more difficult to do in a standard narcotics case. If
an undercover officer requests 100 grams of a substance, and the defendant
provides that, how much should be “calculated out”? If the officer conducts
ten purchases with the individual, should only the first nine transactions be
used to calculate his sentence? When defendants make such requests, they
are almost uniformly rejected.279
There is some indication, however, that these sentencing arguments are
effective if framed as a request for a general downward variance or
below-Guidelines sentence. The Tenth Circuit explicitly noted that,
following Booker’s clarification that the Guidelines are advisory (rather than
mandatory), a sentencing judge may consider a sentencing entrapment or
manipulation defense outside of their strict doctrines as a request for variance
under the § 3553(a) factors.280 The court noted that these factors require
courts to consider the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and
271. Cf. United States v. Sanchez-Berrios, 424 F.3d 65, 78–79 (1st Cir. 2005).
272. See Joh, supra note 6, at 163–65.
273. See id. at 174.
274. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1421; supra Part I.B.
275. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1421–22.
276. See id. at 1422.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 715 F. App’x 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2018); United
States v. Ruiz, 446 F.3d 762, 773–74 (8th Cir. 2006).
278. See United States v. Atwater, 336 F. Supp. 2d 626 (E.D. Va. 2004) (challenging a
school zone enhancement); United States v. Brewster, 1 F.3d 51, 55 (1st Cir. 1993)
(challenging an enhancement based on an undercover officer’s request that the defendant sell
automatic weapons).
279. See, e.g., supra notes 224–29.
280. See United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1019–20 (10th Cir. 2009).
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theorized that manipulation would be appropriate grounds for a
below-Guidelines sentence.281 This mirrors an earlier holding in the Eighth
Circuit, which explained that judges may consider a downward variance in a
manipulation scenario under § 3553(a)(1)’s “nature and circumstances”
provision.282 And, as one district court in Rhode Island suggested in
response to a sentencing manipulation defense, “[t]here may be cases in
which the subjective motives of agents is a consideration because a defendant
is unfairly targeted for different treatment due to his race or some other
invidiously discriminatory reason.”283
These suggestions point to what may be an unspoken reality of
manipulated sentencing cases: sentencing courts are reluctant to set firm
definitions for these two defenses but may be open to issuing a downward
variance under § 3553(a) for conduct that clearly inflated an individual’s
sentence.284 Booker’s determination that the Guidelines are advisory made
it possible for sentencing judges to subconsciously or explicitly adjust
sentences to reflect exceptional elements of a defendant or their offense,
especially when those elements are clearly racialized.285
For example, a California district court recently held that information on
racial disparities in federal criminal cases can and should be a sentencing
consideration under § 3553(a)(6).286 In resentencing proceedings for one of
the Chicago stash house cases, an Illinois district court held that the § 3553(a)
factors heavily supported a sentencing reduction because of disparities
produced by stash house tactics.287 In another stash house case, after deeply
criticizing the ATF’s discriminatory enforcement tactics, a district judge
wrote:
In sentencing any defendant, one of the primary purposes of the governing
statute is to “promote respect for the law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Respect
for the law begins with respect for the people and institutions that are sworn

281. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3533(a)(1)).
282. See id.
283. United States v. Dion, 89 F. Supp. 2d 185, 188 (D.R.I. 2000).
284. See Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1019 (“Booker did not alter the standard for a defendant
to succeed on a claim of outrageous governmental conduct, but a defendant’s claim of
sentencing factor manipulation may also be considered as request for a variance from the
applicable guideline range under the § 3553(a) factors.”).
285. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 334 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“As
long as ‘there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission,’ they permit a judge to
depart from a Guidelines sentence based on facts that constitute elements of the crime . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
286. See United States v. York, No. 20-CR-00479-EMC-1, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104307,
at *4–7 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2021) (“Disparities in the racial composition of transferees from
state to federal court is important because it may tend to confirm and underscore the validity
of the disparities . . . it may also provide insight into the sources of that disparity.”).
287. See United States v. Conley, No. 11 CR 0779-6, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40763, at *16
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 4, 2021).
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to enforce and protect the law. In fashioning the sentences for each of the
defendants in this case, this court will be most mindful of that directive.288

Following this precedent, it may be more effective for defendants to build
a sentencing argument under the § 3553(a) factors, questioning the nature
and seriousness of their offense because of the way agents selectively
weaponized the Guidelines.289 This type of argument would permit a
sentencing judge to use their discretion, either explicitly or implicitly, to
exercise sentencing leniency without forcing the court to evaluate the
difficult, high bars for predisposition or outrageousness in sentencing
entrapment and manipulation claims.290 And it would allow defendants to
point to manipulative law enforcement conduct on the grounds that it leads
to unwarranted sentencing disparities, implicating a sentencing court’s
discretion under § 3553(a)(6). This type of argument is normally precluded
under a sentencing entrapment or manipulation defense because of the
standards used to evaluate these claims.291
This corrective opportunity at sentencing is far from perfect—there is
extensive evidence that sentencing judges continue to ignore obviously
racialized aspects of the criminal legal system.292 But, for defendants, it is
an argument available nowhere else.293 In the decades since the
implementation of the Guidelines, there has been ample opportunity to
weaponize them into inflated sentences.294 Stash house cases illustrate what
occurs when this opportunity enables virtually unlimited discretion.295
Although stash house stings are disappearing, lower-level manipulated
offenses are not.296 With the eradication of stash house cases comes the
288. United States v. Paxton, No. 13 CR 0103, 2018 WL 4504160, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
20, 2018).
289. For example, in 2015, the D.C. Circuit remanded a sentence for reconsideration after
holding that a sentencing manipulation argument spoke to the “nature of the offense,” a
relevant § 3553(a) factor. United States v. Bigley, 786 F.3d 11, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per
curiam).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Genao, 831 F. Supp. 246, 247–50, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(finding that the amount of narcotics induced by undercover buyers overstated the defendant’s
culpability in a drug conspiracy, warranting a downward variance, even absent a sentencing
entrapment or manipulation defense).
291. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, No. 99-1009, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 26504, at
*1–3 (2d Cir. Oct. 20, 1999) (rejecting a race-based sentencing manipulation claim, where a
Black defendant argued that white defendants implicated in the same sting operation were
coerced to sell a form of cocaine subject to lesser punishment).
292. See Webb, supra note 187, at 136–37.
293. Id. at 141–42 (“Sentencing provides a particularly rich opportunity for defense
lawyers to advocate for individual clients while addressing larger questions of social and racial
injustice. At sentencing, a powerful narrative on the client’s behalf can impact the court’s
decision-making in significant ways.”).
294. See supra Part I.B.
295. See United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010) (stating that stash house
stings give the government “unfettered ability to inflate the amount of drugs supposedly in the
house and thereby obtain a greater sentence for the defendant.”).
296. Outside of immigration offenses, narcotics and firearms offenses are the most
common charges faced by defendants in federal court. See GLENN R. SCHMITT & AMANDA
RUSSELL, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2020: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES
9–11 (2021), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
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chance to counter similarly manipulated sentences in a way that
acknowledges the discriminatory harm of this phenomenon.
III. ADDRESSING MANIPULATION AT THE SENTENCING PHASE
In their current form, the sentencing entrapment and manipulation
defenses do not adequately protect defendants.297 These defenses are
unrecognized in several circuits, barring meritorious claims that an
individual’s sentence was grossly increased by law enforcement
misconduct.298 The circuits that do recognize the defenses have chosen such
arduous standards of evaluation that the claims are effectively barred there
as well.299 Moreover, the standards chosen to evaluate sentencing
entrapment or manipulation claims may, in fact, propagate racial disparities
at sentencing. The “subjective” analysis is a regressive view of a defendant,
looking to his past behavior as an indication of how likely he was to commit
the new offense independent of government coercion.300 This encourages
courts to look at racialized factors such as criminal history, rather than at the
broader picture of how and why the escalated offense occurred.301 The
“objective” analysis is a more helpful lens, shifting focus onto the
government’s conduct in the offense.302 But the standard chosen to evaluate
this argument—outrageousness—is a high bar to pass due to its focus on
overwhelming coercion.303 And, outrageousness is usually an inquiry into
how law enforcement interacted with a single defendant, rather than how they
are conducting their sentencing schemes on a broader level.304 So although,
in retrospect, it is instinctive to assert that the conduct of police in
Albuquerque, Chicago, or San Francisco was outrageous, that argument does
not resonate under an individualized sentencing manipulation defense.305
The failure of viable sentencing entrapment and manipulation defenses is
troubling. First, the lack of a successful defense for manipulated sentencing
schemes gives the government immense authority to predetermine an
individual’s sentence at the outset of an undercover operation.306 This
undermines the Guidelines’ stated goal of pursuing consistency in sentencing
by subjecting a set of individuals to higher sentences than they would have

publications/2021/FY20_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/26GGVBE8].
297. See Tinto, supra note 1, at 1413–15 (critiquing the current doctrine of sentencing
manipulation).
298. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, No. 20-2262, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 24314, at *5
(3d Cir. Aug. 16, 2021); United States v. Young, 818 F. App’x 185, 195 (4th Cir. 2020)
(declining to rule on the merits of sentencing entrapment and manipulation claims).
299. See supra Part II.B.
300. See supra Part II.B.1.
301. See supra Part II.B.1.
302. See Abelson, supra note 77, at 781.
303. See id.
304. See supra Part II.B.2.
305. See supra note 230.
306. See supra Part I.B.
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received absent manipulation.307 Second, the history, structure, and
incentives of federal DEA or ATF operations indicate that this manipulation
can be done in a racist manner without any safeguards or court rebuke.308
Recourse for this type of discriminatory enforcement has had to come from
lengthy civil rights litigation or public outcry, which has almost certainly left
some defendants without relief.309
This Note argues that sentencing hearings offer an earlier opportunity to
push back against manipulated sentences. This can be done by making an
argument under § 3553(a) that law enforcement’s manipulation of the
Guidelines warrants a downward variance under §§ 3553(a)(1)–(2)’s “nature
and seriousness of the offense” provisions, as well as § 3553(a)(6)’s “need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities” provision.310 This Note proposes
two methods to build this argument. Part III.A argues that defendants can
use a narrative approach to point to parallels between their lower-level
manipulated offense cases and fake stash house cases to argue that the nature
of their offense was influenced by law enforcement misconduct. This
argument would be supported by the materials obtained in stash house
litigation. Part III.B proposes bolstering this argument with district-level
data that would illustrate how manipulative law enforcement conduct
contributes to sentencing disparities and warrants departure under
§ 3553(a)(6). Both sections describe how this approach could circumvent
the high standards used to evaluate the traditional sentencing entrapment and
manipulation defenses and avoid a race-neutral analysis that ignores the
disparities inherent in sentencing schemes.
A. Building a Sentencing Narrative Under § 3553(a)
Fake stash house cases provide a powerful narrative. They implicate both
the DEA and ATF, the agencies responsible for the bulk of federal narcotics
and weapons charges.311 The orchestrated stings occurred in major urban
hubs around the country and present a clear picture of selective
enforcement.312 They demonstrate that many individuals will comply with
requests for high volumes of narcotics and weapons out of economic
desperation, or because the government has entirely selected the
determinative volumes in their offense, and it takes substantially less effort
on the defendant’s part to independently obtain such a volume.313 Stash
house cases are an emotionally salient, compelling illustration of how
weaponizing the Guidelines can unduly influence an individual to engage in
conduct he otherwise would never be involved in.314

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra notes 229–33.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
See supra notes 27–30.
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Heath, supra note 28.
See supra Part I.B.1.
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Because there are few limits to the types of arguments that a defendant can
make at sentencing, there is an opportunity at these hearings to describe any
factors of their case that mirror this persuasive narrative. A defendant can
point out that, like in stash house cases, his manipulation took place in an
economically depressed or historically over-policed neighborhood, limiting
the types of individuals who would be ensnared.315 He may describe how an
agent or confidential informant had absolute discretion to influence his
sentence with the volume, number of transactions, and incentives they
used.316 A defendant may argue that the opportunity that law enforcement
created was an exceptional windfall and did not accurately reflect any
previous offense he engaged in.317
These arguments would state that the nature and circumstances of the
defendant’s offense under § 3553(a)(1), and the seriousness of the offense
under § 3553(a)(2)(A), warrant leniency in cases of manipulation.318 They
would imply that the resulting offense should not be considered as severe as
that same offense committed by an individual absent law enforcement
coercion. The fact that those tactics often rely on vulnerable or financially
pressed individuals speaks to this point.319 By incorporating information
about questionable law enforcement tactics into sentencing narratives, a
defendant can argue for a sentence outside his guideline calculation by
connecting such concerns to the § 3553(a) goals that guide judicial
sentencing discretion.320
Defendants may also point to a stronger body of evidence that the DEA or
ATF failed to introduce safeguards to prevent discriminatory enhancement
of sentences.321 The discovery order pursued in the Chicago stash house
litigation sought all ATF manuals, circulars, field notes, and documentation
that would reveal how the agency selected targets for stash house operations
and determined the volumes of narcotics or weapons to use in the setups.322
These materials were important to obtain because, by documenting tangible,
official government policy, they can supplant testimony regarding abstract,
in-the-moment decision-making by law enforcement.323 Showing that the
official policy of federal agencies lacks safeguards for preventing large
increases in individual’s sentences, and increases those sentences in a
discriminatory manner, may help illustrate to a judge how the circumstances
of an offense were arbitrarily defined.324
315. See United States v. Sellers, 906 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 2018) (Nguyen, J.,
concurring).
316. See, e.g., United States v. Briggs, 623 F.3d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 2010).
317. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 70 and accompanying text.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
319. See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 158, at 1820–22.
320. See, e.g., Mark D. Duda, Essay, Remedying Police Brutality Through Sentencing
Reductions, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 99, 112–14 (2021) (proposing similar remedial
sentencing arguments in cases of police brutality).
321. See Siegler & Admussen, supra note 94, at 987.
322. See id.
323. Cf. id. at 1009–10.
324. See id. at 1013.
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Civil rights organizations, law school clinics, and defense attorneys are
mounting more of these selective enforcement suits to take advantage of the
new, lowered discovery standards.325 Individual defendants not included in
these suits can leverage those efforts at their own sentencings by referencing
findings that a federal agency acted in a biased manner in targeting
defendants for manipulated sentencing schemes, particularly if they are
located in the same city where the suit is brought.326 It would not be an
uncredible argument to say the ATF or DEA has a historical track record of
failing to self-regulate their efforts or to take precautions that would eliminate
the racial tilt of their tactics.327 It would not be an enormously difficult
inference for a sentencing judge to understand that, if the federal agencies are
acting in a discriminatory manner in some of their operations, those tactics
likely carry over to lower-level offenses.328 Substantiating those points with
the hundreds of pages of testimony, data, and materials brought to light in
stash house cases may make these arguments more persuasive.329
Rather than attaching this argument to a specific enhancement or
calculable volume, as the traditional sentencing entrapment and manipulation
defenses require, a § 3553(a) argument would need to be framed as a request
for a substantial downward variance in light of the extenuating circumstances
that influence a sentencing scheme. Although this may make relief less
predictable, it allows defendants to argue for a more holistic review of their
offense and avoid the high standards under the subjective and objective
analyses.330 And although a judge’s discretion is a difficult variable to
predict, both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have already approved of this
approach, permitting judges to consider sentencing entrapment and
manipulation-type arguments as requests for variance.331 The circuits that
do not entertain the two sentencing defenses at all are mandated to consider
§ 3553(a) factors, so this strategy could provide relief for defendants who are
otherwise barred from manipulation defenses.332

325. See id. at 991.
326. See, e.g., Duda, supra note 320 (proposing localized, remedial sentencing arguments
in cases of police brutality).
327. See supra Part I.C.2.
328. One fact speaking to this point is that the testifying agent in Albuquerque, who stated
that ATF actions were “race neutral,” was one of the agents responsible for orchestrating the
Chicago stash house cases. See Proctor, supra note 171.
329. For example, the ACLU obtained all of the offender statistics that the ATF relied on
in the Albuquerque drug trafficking operation to undermine the argument that the ATF was
targeting individuals with violent criminal histories. See United States v. Jackson, No.
16cr2362 MCA, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21067, at *3–5 (D.N.M. Feb. 7, 2018). The ACLU
also obtained all the location data for where confidential informants were sent to contact
targets to see the neighborhoods and locations where the ATF focused their efforts. Id. at
*34–35.
330. See supra Part II.B.
331. See supra notes 280–83 and accompanying text.
332. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 676 F. App’x 177, 178 (4th Cir. 2017). Although
the Fourth Circuit generally declines to recognize sentencing entrapment or manipulation
defenses, here, the Lucas court noted that a district court evaluated the argument under a
§ 3553(a) consideration. See id.
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Raising these systemic arguments against sentencing manipulation would
invoke the slowly emerging willingness to use § 3553(a) to correct overly
harsh sentences for drug offenses.333 Writing in support of deviation from
punitive Guidelines sentences in 2016, Judge John Gleeson from the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York articulated, “[w]e need to
make smart, bold choices about two things: (1) the lengths of the prison
terms we impose on those who need to be imprisoned; and (2) the categories
of defendants we routinely incarcerate who don’t need to be imprisoned in
the first place.”334 In 2010, Judge Nancy Gertner from the U.S. District Court
for the District of Massachusetts criticized the Guidelines recommendation
for a narcotics offense as “wholly inconsistent to the purposes of sentencing
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”335 These statements reflect a broader contingent
of sentencing courts now willing to consider their role in redressing the
Guidelines’ ability to levy disproportionate punishment.336 Sentencing
arguments that speak to the injustice of selectively weaponizing the
Guidelines implicate these exact concerns and may convince a court that
shorter sentences are warranted.
Arguing for a sentencing reduction on § 3553(a) grounds will likely
require more than just a presumption that cases involving lower-level
manipulated offenses mirror the problems inherent in stash house schemes.
Using some of the tactics key to stash house litigation could overcome this
problem and help build an argument under § 3553(a)(6) that sentencing
manipulation contributes to unwarranted sentencing disparities based on an
individual’s race. This could be accomplished by including racially coded
district-level data into sentencing briefings, which would show a pattern of
selective enforcement for sentencing schemes on the local level. The
following section discusses how such data could be compiled without
requiring the same degree of cohesiveness as the stash house litigation.

333. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 948 F. Supp. 2d 1009 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (sentencing
defendant below the Guidelines recommendation after a § 3553(a) evaluation showed minimal
role in a narcotics offense); United States v. Woody, No. 8:09CR382, 2010 WL 2884918,
*4–5 (D. Neb. July 20, 2010) (sentencing defendant to under half the Guidelines
recommendation, in recognition of policy concerns over methamphetamines sentences).
334. United States v. Dokmeci, No. 13-CR-00455, 2016 WL 915185, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
9, 2016).
335. United States v. Whigham, 754 F. Supp. 2d 239, 242 (D. Mass. 2010).
336. See, e.g., United States v. Feauto, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1024–25 (N.D. Iowa 2015)
(“[I]n most of the over 1,000 congressionally-mandated mandatory minimum sentences that
I have imposed over the past twenty-two years, I have stated on the record that they were
unjust and too harsh.”); United States v. Shull, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1050 (S.D. Ohio 2011)
(“The history of unfairness in crack cocaine sentencing is well known, but the inaccuracies it
was based on and the injustices it caused make its retelling all the more necessary.”); see also
Mark K. Bennett, A Slow Motion Lynching?: The War on Drugs, Mass Incarceration, Doing
Kimbrough Justice, and a Response to Two Third Circuit Judges, 66 RUTGERS L. REV. 873,
892–96 (2014) (describing the potential for sentencing judges to consider serious policy
disagreements with Guidelines sentences).
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B. Using Data to Warrant Consideration Under § 3553(a)(6)
On the national level, there is no cohesive, quantitative data on the
prevalence of police inducement or the race of defendants caught in these
schemes. This information is likely siloed in public defenders’ offices
nationwide.337 The difficulty of collecting data from these offices is
well-documented: crushing caseloads, under-resourced attorneys, and
underfunded offices all contribute to the deficit in data from public defense
systems.338
Data showing a cohesive portrait of ATF actions in Chicago was critical
to convincing courts and the broader public that stash house stings are
conducted in a discriminatory manner.339 In Professor Siegler’s later
statements to the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary on this topic in
March 2021, Siegler noted that it took nine months, hundreds of pages of
motions, and a civil enforcement subpoena to obtain the racially coded data
that they needed to bring their selective enforcement claim.340 The resources
and time needed to do this are completely inaccessible to most defendants
and their attorneys, particularly when dealing with cases that are not as
discrete or do not carry the same intense sentences as stash house schemes.341
However, a sentencing defense does not require the same level of
discovery or cohesiveness as a selective enforcement claim.342 At
sentencing, a judge need only be swayed that there is a likelihood of
unwarranted sentencing disparity if they adhere to the recommended
Guidelines sentence.343 What would thus be useful in this setting is reliable
data showing that a narrow subset of defendants is being subjected to
ratcheted sentences, or that law enforcement is concentrating their sentencing
schemes in a narrow set of neighborhoods.344 Most of this information is
already located in defendant case files and should be disclosable so long as
they are anonymized.345 If public defenders’ offices can obtain some data
that indicates that law enforcement in their district is ratcheting up
defendants’ sentences in a discriminatory manner, public defenders may
build an argument for leniency on the basis of sentencing disparity.
This reverse engineering of sentencing patterns using internal data is
already underway in some public defender offices in an effort to better

337. See Laurin, supra note 137, at 373–75.
338. See id.
339. See Siegler & Admussen, supra note 94, at 987–89.
340. See id.
341. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 296, at 9 (noting that approximately 75 percent
of defendants in federal court face a term of incarceration of less than five years).
342. See Webb, supra note 187, at 134.
343. See, e.g., id. at 147–49 (describing how to build a persuasive sentencing narrative on
racial justice grounds).
344. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
345. See, e.g., NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N, BASIC DATA EVERY DEFENDER PROGRAM
NEEDS TO TRACK: A TOOLKIT FOR DEFENDER LEADERS (2014), https://www.nlada.org/
sites/default/files/pictures/BASIC%20DATA%20TOOLKIT%2010-27-14%20Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3XJY-UWQB].
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understand sentencing disparities.346 The North Carolina Indigent Defense
Manual Series recommends that public defenders’ offices rely on interns,
volunteers, or paralegals to anonymously track biographical data and
sentencing patterns in their district to better see disparities.347 Coding by
offense type could be more time-consuming, but flagging any case where
undercover work or manipulation was at play could help reverse engineer a
picture of what undercover enforcement looks like in the district. Defenders
also often rely on checklists or interview sheets at the arraignment stage to
gain critical information about their client’s lives.348 It is standard procedure
to ask a client about conditions of the incident arrest, and information on law
enforcement’s role in the offense may be collected at this juncture.349
Working this information into sentencing materials gives a more complete
picture of how Guidelines manipulation can selectively increase individuals’
sentences, implicating consideration under § 3553(a)(6).350 This would
follow the emerging willingness to use § 3553(a)(6) to consider race and
policy-based sentencing disparities.351 For example, after Booker restored
some judicial sentencing discretion in 2005, the number of marijuana
offenses sentenced below-Guidelines nearly doubled.352 This was attributed
to an acknowledgement of selective enforcement of federal marijuana
offenses and its resulting sentencing disparities.353 Data on selective
manipulation may also be particularly salient in narcotics cases, where
federal judges have shown more willingness to engage with facts and studies
that show sentencing disparities for these offenses.354
The applicability of these arguments to lower-level manipulated offense
cases will not be perfect. Sentencing hearings typically focus solely on an
individual and their actions, which is rational, given that this is the primary
opportunity for the defense to humanize a defendant and credibly advance
their sentencing goals.355 Not all cases of offense manipulation mirror stash
346. See, e.g., Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies, How Do We “Do Data” in Public Defense?,
78 ALBANY L. REV. 1179, 1189 (2015) (discussing improvements to data tracking in public
defense offices).
347. See Alyson A. Grine & Emily Coward, Raising Issues of Race in North Carolina
Criminal Cases, in INDIGENT DEFENSE MANUAL SERIES, at 9-1, 9-15 (John Rubin ed., 2014),
https://defendermanuals.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/20140457_chap%2009_Final_20
14-10-28.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AWC-C6RG].
348. See, e.g., Robin Steinberg, Addressing Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System
Through Holistic Defense, CHAMPION, July 2013, at 51, 51–52.
349. See id.
350. See supra notes 285–87 and accompanying text.
351. See Adam Davidson, Comment, Learning from History in Changing Times: Taking
Account of Evolving Marijuana Laws in Federal Sentencing, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 2105,
2150–52 (2016) (discussing the emerging interpretation of § 3553(a)(6) as a mandate to
consider equity principles).
352. See id. at 2151.
353. See id.; see also United States v. Dayi, 980 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687–89 (D. Md. 2013).
354. See, e.g., United States v. Bannister, No. 10-CR-0053, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30569,
at *61–65, *159 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2011) (extensively discussing data on racial disparities
in drug sentencing and refusing to uphold a defendant’s higher sentence); see also Kimbrough
v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 97 (2007).
355. See Webb, supra note 187, at 142.
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house tactics in their egregiousness and could convince a court to look
outside the individual. And not all judges may be persuaded that
manipulation of an individual creates sentencing disparities or warrants
leniency in consideration of their offense. Still, sentencing courts can and
should be more willing to engage with these issues, particularly when law
enforcement weaponizes the Guidelines that sentencing courts use to justify
their monumental decision to incarcerate a person.356
Concerns about the linkage between race and policing are not new and
arise directly from the United States’s extensive history of violence against
people of color.357 Examinations of nationwide policing tactics and the
criminal legal process itself consistently show harshness toward individuals
of color, particularly young Black and Latino men.358 Reducing sentences
on grounds of manipulation will not cease such embedded racism. But it is
one slight method of reducing sentencing inequity and the disproportionate
harm of incarceration. And, as shown by stash house cases, judicial
admonishment of discriminatory manipulation can act as a deterrent to law
enforcement designing these stings.359 This Note argues that those are
objectives worth pursuing.
CONCLUSION
From school zone enhancements to inflated narcotics volumes, the
government will always have the opportunity to mold and manufacture an
individual’s sentence. Federal law enforcement agencies have shown,
repeatedly, that this discretion will be exercised in a discriminatory manner.
So long as this reality exists, this Note argues that every effort should be
made to ensure that an individual is not sentenced on that basis.
The Chicago stash house litigation was a momentous success for the
individuals it exonerated, but that victory should not be viewed as conclusive.
It should instead be conceived as a first step in dismantling a long pattern of
selective enforcement and an opportunity to analogize and leverage its
successes. That task will require far more than this Note’s recommendations
for sentencing arguments. This proposal advances that any opportunity to
advocate for sentencing reduction is a valuable one.
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See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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